Repeated spillovers are warning signals: 频繁溢出事件是预警信号
Repeated spillovers are warning signals: high-level political negotiations must value pandemic prevention at source
2026年南美安第斯地区报告了Andes汉坦病毒群发感染事件,这可能不是下一次大流行,但不应被视为孤立事件。频繁的动物到人类溢出事件往往是大流行前的预警信号,但全球卫生系统对此重视不足,特别是在低收入和中等收入国家。加强兽医监测、野生动物监控和社区检测系统对于早期发现和管理这些威胁至关重要。
Repeated zoonotic spillovers offer opportunities to prevent pandemics, but the systems that detect and reduce these risks remain underfunded. Here, we argue that international agreements must secure sustained, equitable investment in these One Health systems and the communities supporting them.
The 2026 cluster of Andes hantavirus infections reported in South America is unlikely to be the next pandemic1. But treating such events as isolated outbreaks repeats a long-standing error in global health preparedness. Most major zoonotic pandemics were preceded by repeated animal-to-human spillover before sustained human-to-human transmission became established2,3,4.
HIV originated from repeated exposure of humans to simian immunodeficiency viruses during hunting, butchering, and trade of nonhuman primates5. Influenza pandemics also have arisen from the repeated circulation and reassortment of the virus among wild birds, domestic animals and humans4. Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV-1), Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), mpox, Rift Valley fever, highly pathogenic avian influenza and hantaviruses are all examples of the same epidemiological reality: pandemic emergence is often preceded by recurrent and geographically localized interspecies transmission events4,6.
These repeated spillovers are not epidemiological noise. They can provide early warning signals and critical windows for prevention, preparedness, and scientific innovation. Yet they remain undervalued by global health systems, particularly in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), remote rural locations, or outside the human health sector.
The foundation of pandemic preparedness
Scientific advances that allow for swift responses to pandemics seldom start once a pandemic has been declared. The historic speed of development of COVID-19 vaccines was achieved thanks to decades of previous research on coronaviruses, including work done after the SARS epidemic in 2003, surveillance of MERS-CoV transmission from dromedaries and ecological studies of coronaviruses circulating within bat populations. Years of work on highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses in circulating wild and domestic bird populations similarly helped to improve technologies that support pandemic influenza preparedness. Candidate vaccine viruses and “mock-up” vaccines were developed through animal and environmental surveillance prior to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic.
Much of the knowledge that underpins pandemic preparedness does not come from human epidemics. Most studies of pathogens focus on their spread in animals and ecosystems before pathogens can effectively transmit from human to human. Therefore, veterinary surveillance, wildlife monitoring, environmental sampling and community-based detection systems are frequently employed to produce epidemiological intelligence, genomic sequences, pathogen isolates, ecological understanding and risk assessment data7. Strong national Veterinary Services, supported by sustainable financing, laboratory networks, and implementation of World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) international standards, are central to the early detection and management of zoonotic threats. Mechanisms such as WOAH’s World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS) and the Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) Pathway contribute to strengthening transparency, surveillance capacity and preparedness for zoonotic threats.
Why prevention remains underfunded
What we observe is likely the visible tip of a much larger iceberg of spillovers. Despite growing surveillance and research, major blind spots persist. Localized outbreaks often receive little attention until they threaten high-income countries or cause many human cases. The 2022 global mpox outbreak followed recurrent epidemics in West and Central Africa6, including Nigeria’s resurgence in 20176. Rift Valley fever (RVF) continues to recur despite known health and economic risks, illustrated by severe livestock export bans in Somalia in 20018. In Patagonia, Andes hantavirus transmission has been reported for years; the 2026 cruise-ship cluster illustrates the international implications of localized zoonotic threats.
Scientific warnings must also translate into sustained preparedness measures. Lumpy skin disease’s emergence into Europe in 2025 is an example9. Although not zoonotic, this animal disease has circulated for years in Africa and parts of Asia, and with risks of geographic expansion identified by veterinary research, early preparedness and diagnostic capacity were lacking in several newly affected regions. These failures show that pandemic prevention cannot rely only on reactive, pathogen-specific approaches.
Underinvestment reflects more than resource scarcity. Global pathogen priorities do not match communities’ immediate concerns, weakening reporting and engagement. Prevention requires action in veterinary, agricultural and environmental services, whose costs fall outside human health budgets while benefits extend across sectors and borders10. Strengthening shared local systems and addressing risky practices and environmental drivers can therefore complement disease-specific programmes without depending on a predetermined pathogen list. Encouragingly, the Pandemic Fund’s results framework includes risk reduction and prevention, One Health and community engagement. These investments, international initiatives such as Preventing Zoonotic Disease Emergence (PREZODE) and other research and development programmes offer foundations for prevention at source11. Lasting impact requires scaling local demonstrations into sustained services, with domestic financing beyond grants. International agreements can reinforce continuity between crises.
Equitable sharing requires sustained prevention
These observations are relevant to high-level negotiations on the Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing (PABS) annex of the Pandemic Agreement and wider commitments on Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response (PPPR) such as the 2026 revised UNGA PPPR declaration. Debate has centred on rapidly sharing pathogen samples and genomic data following emergence in human populations. This focus incompletely reflects the broader One Health framework from which much of the value of pandemic preparedness is derived10. International commitments should sustain the upstream generation of knowledge between emergencies.
Many pathogens with pandemic potential are first detected through animal, environmental, or One Health surveillance in LMICs, where people often live in close proximity to livestock, wildlife, and changing ecosystems12. Communities, frontline veterinarians, field epidemiologists, ecologists and laboratory technicians generate knowledge and samples essential to global risk assessment and innovation. But these systems remain chronically underfunded, fragmented and unequally supported12,13.
Timely sharing of pathogens and scientific information is critical for global health security. But for the sake of equity, it is important to acknowledge the huge scientific, operational and economic value of these data, samples and epidemiological insights. Vaccines, diagnostics, therapeutics, preparedness plans and contingency strategies often depend on data generated long before international emergencies are declared. Much of this basic intelligence comes from animal and environmental surveillance systems in LMICs.
Thus, a fair PABS mechanism should go beyond access to vaccines and medical countermeasures when pandemics have already emerged. It should also provide for sustained investments in prevention at source, including strengthening surveillance capacities, supporting integrated One Health research, funding local laboratory infrastructure, reinforcing community-based detection systems and allowing for rapid control of localised outbreaks before wider dissemination occurs13. Without such investments, countries with recurring spillovers will not be able to stop epidemic amplification pathways at their source.
Turning commitments into lasting capacities
The 2026 Bundibugyo Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, its seventeenth since 1976, illustrates the consequences of delayed detection and challenges in communities’ engagement. Around US$2.9 billion in response commitments were reported in September 2026. Community-based One Health early warning systems support risk reduction, earlier alerts and trusted dialogue among communities, laboratories and authorities, facilitating culturally appropriate response11,12. Repeated spillovers and epidemic potential can guide targeted actions, while community reporting of unusual animal deaths, human illness and environmental changes serves multiple threats. Co-design, recurrent financing and evaluation of local epidemiological, social and economic returns can improve resource allocation sustainability. Conflict complicates implementation, reinforcing the need for locally owned and adapted approaches.
Prevention at source also offers co-benefits for poverty reduction, food security, biodiversity, climate resilience and rural livelihoods. One Health surveillance and prevention can advance global health security and sustainable development and deserve recognition within equitable pathogen information-sharing frameworks.
The world cannot benefit from the intelligence generated by repeated spillovers while ignoring the systems and communities producing it. Integrating local expertise into research, innovation and decision-making is essential to equity. Global health governance remains largely shaped by Global North actors, often overlooking priorities and expertise in the Global South. International negotiations must ensure meaningful inclusion of Global South scientists, clinicians, veterinarians and communities throughout research and innovation. Strengthening local capacities and equitable partnerships can deliver more sustainable, locally relevant outcomes than technology transfer alone. PABS negotiations offer an opportunity to embed these principles in global health governance.
Repeated spillover events are not marginal or localized anomalies, and pandemic prevention and preparedness should not start when sustained human-to-human transmission is detected. By then, the critical opportunities to avert a pandemic may have already passed. They are alerts, opportunities for interventions and global public goods. If the international community is serious about preventing future pandemics and not just reacting to them, high-level political engagement should (i) recognise repeated spillovers as strong opportunities for prevention intervention, and (ii) equitably support the countries and communities where they occur. Priority investments should include strengthening national Veterinary Services and integrated One Health surveillance systems; supporting community-based detection and rapid response mechanisms; expanding laboratory, genomic sequencing and data-sharing capacities beyond human health only; improving interoperability between animal, human and environmental health sectors; reinforcing both national and regional research and laboratory networks; and establishing sustainable financing mechanisms for prevention at source. These measures would not only improve global pandemic preparedness, but also strengthen food security, rural livelihoods, biodiversity protection and resilient health systems.
Data availability
No datasets were generated or analysed during the current study.
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Acknowledgements
The authors thank the many researchers, policy-makers, practitioners and community partners involved in PREZODE and related One Health initiatives whose experiences and discussions informed the perspectives presented in this Comment.
Funding
This work was supported by the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) through the PREACTS programme, implemented under the PREZODE initiative, and by institutional funding from CIRAD. The funders had no role in the design, interpretation, or writing of this work.
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Authors and Affiliations
CIRAD, UMR ASTRE, Montpellier, France
Marisa Peyre
PREZODE, Paris, France
Marisa Peyre, Papa Seck & Servane Baufume
ISRA / LNERV, Dakar-Hann, Senegal
Papa Seck
CIRAD, DGDRS, Montpellier, France
Servane Baufume
World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH), Paris, France
Chadia Wannous
Authors
- Marisa Peyre
- Papa Seck
- Servane Baufume
- Chadia Wannous
Contributions
M.P. conceived the manuscript. M.P. prepared the initial draft. All authors contributed to the investigation, analysis and development of the arguments as part of the INB IGWG PABS negotiations and the group of friends of the HLM UNGA PPPR 2026 resolution, critically revised the manuscript for important intellectual content, and approved the final version.
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Correspondence to Marisa Peyre.
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Peyre, M., Seck, P., Baufume, S. et al. Repeated spillovers are warning signals: high-level political negotiations must value pandemic prevention at source. Commun. Health 1, 48 (2026). https://doi.org/10.1038/s44528-026-00061-y
Received: 22 June 2026
Accepted: 27 October 2026
Published: 20 November 2026
Version of record: 20 November 2026
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s44528-026-00061-y
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