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孵化大流行防范准备:卫生安全中社区参与式智能的社会算法

Incubating pandemic preparedness: a social algorithm for community-participatory intelligence in health security

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一种面向大流行防范准备的“孵化器”方法被提出,将社区作为卫生安全知识生产的一个认知层级,并以社会算法整合社区参与式智能。文章以COVID-19和西非埃博拉经验说明,准备度指数难以捕捉信任、非正式沟通和地方治理等社会结构。该方法依托CBPR的共同学习、权力共享与迭代行动,补充人口级指数和个体定性资料。

正文

The preparedness paradox

Preparedness systems are the standing arrangements through which a jurisdiction anticipates, detects, and manages acute public health events: legislation and emergency powers, surveillance and laboratory capacity, response plans, a trained workforce, stockpiles, and coordination mechanisms across health and non-health sectors. They are designed for a graded range of events, from a localised outbreak to a pandemic or other health emergency of international concern. Communities are not peripheral to these arrangements but constitutive of them: they are where the first signals appear, where advice is trusted or disregarded, where protective behaviours are adopted or abandoned, and where every response measure is ultimately implemented. Field experience during the West African Ebola crisis illustrated this with unusual clarity. Transmission was interrupted largely in places where local actors — community leaders, burial societies, survivors, and frontline volunteers — reshaped surveillance, care, and burial practices themselves, and the peer-led capacity-building initiatives that followed were built on precisely this recognition.1.

The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated how much preparedness systems can gain by expanding their field of vision: countries with high scores on readiness indices — including the Global Health Security Index and International Health Regulations (IHR) Joint External Evaluation assessments — sometimes performed below expectations, while others with more modest scores showed impressive adaptive capacity.2,3,4 The indices capture formal capacities: laboratories, legal frameworks, surveillance infrastructure, and response plans. They do not measure the social fabric in which those capacities are embedded: the trust between communities and authorities, the informal communication channels that carry early signals, and the local governance arrangements that enable coordinated action when put under pressure.

More indicators cannot close this gap. It is a conceptual opportunity: to reframe how preparedness systems generate and use knowledge.2,3,4,5 Existing preparedness frameworks have treated risk as a function of probability and impact estimated from past events, assuming that context-specific variability can be averaged across jurisdictions. COVID-19 demonstrated how much performance under stress depends on contextual factors — trust, informal support networks, local governance — and opened the door to methodologies that can systematically capture these dimensions.5,6,7.

Risk as deviation: a different starting point

A more generative framing starts not from historical hazard estimates but from objectives. Organisations and societies define what they are trying to achieve: e.g. protecting health, maintaining equity, preserving trust, sustaining essential services. Risk is understood as adverse deviation from these objectives; opportunity, crucially, is beneficial deviation.8,9 Deviations become the primary object of analysis. What matters is where they occur, how large they are, and which contextual conditions shape them. Context is no longer background noise to be averaged away but intrinsic to the analysis: the same challenge carries different consequences depending on whether it occurs in a trusted system with adaptive capacity or in one that needs targeted support.

This prospective, deviation-focused perspective connects naturally with transdisciplinary systems thinking. Under conditions of high stakes, deep uncertainty, and contested values, knowledge and decision-making are enriched by extending beyond technical experts alone to incorporate broader communities of inquiry.8,9 Pandemic preparedness is a paradigmatic case. The questions that generate the greatest practical value — which signals are worth escalating? whose communication is trusted? which coordination arrangements actually work? — are answered in practice, by communities, frontline workers, and local authorities navigating real situations under real constraints.

Communities as an epistemic dimension

Community-based participatory research (CBPR) is a research approach in which academic and community partners share governance of the research process itself. Its defining principles are co-learning, in which researchers and community members each contribute expertise and each expect to be changed by the exchange; power-sharing over decisions about questions, methods, interpretation, and dissemination; and iterative cycles of enquiry and action, in which findings feed back into local practice and the revised practice becomes the next object of study. Applied consistently, these principles have been shown to strengthen the rigour, relevance, and reach of research rather than to trade rigour for participation.10 CBPR demonstrates that communities can generate and interpret knowledge within their own contexts, priorities, and capacities in ways that powerfully complement expert perspectives.6,11,12 Reviews of participatory methods in health services highlight the value of shared governance, reflexivity, and long-term relationships, and show that these principles apply with particular force in settings shaped by structural inequity — including Indigenous health contexts, where community-led engagement approaches have substantially improved the relevance and reach of health research.7 A systematic narrative review of grassroots indicators found that communities co-develop indicators that prioritise trust, reciprocity, and local governance — dimensions that enrich formal preparedness frameworks — and that these indicators reveal aspects of system performance that top-down metrics can miss.13 The incubator methodology responds to this opportunity by treating communities as an epistemic level in their own right, complementing population-level indices and individual-level qualitative accounts.

Because community is the cornerstone of this argument, it requires definition rather than assumption. Within the incubator framework, a community is a bounded social unit whose members share a geographic locality, a collective identity, or a common lived experience and who are linked by routine channels of communication and mutual assistance: a neighbourhood or municipality, an identity-based or faith-based group, a migrant, occupational, or patient network, an established grassroots organisation or a community of practice. Communities so defined are neither monolithic nor inherently harmonious. They contain internal power hierarchies, competing priorities, gender and socioeconomic inequities, exclusions related to disability and language, sharply differing relationships with the state, and uneven distributions of social capital. Legitimate representation, therefore, cannot be presumed from attendance. In the incubator, participants are identified in partnership with more than one existing community organisation, using explicit composition criteria that require the inclusion of groups least likely to be present in formal planning, and each participant’s mandate is stated openly at the outset as speaking from a specific standpoint rather than for the community as a whole. Diversity is key to a successful incubator workshop. Minority and dissenting positions are recorded in the outputs instead of being absorbed into consensus. These are deliberate safeguards against tokenism and elite capture, and they are treated as conditions of validity rather than as courtesies.

Risk communication is the exchange of information, advice, and opinion between experts, authorities, and people at risk, undertaken so that informed protective decisions can be made; community engagement describes the processes through which affected populations take part in identifying problems, setting priorities, and shaping responses. Combined as risk communication and community engagement (RCCE), they constitute an established operational pillar of outbreak preparedness and response.14 The RCCE experience during COVID-19 illustrates both the gap and the opportunity. Rapid reviews document that tailored, community-co-designed communication — using trusted messengers and culturally adapted content — proved highly effective at addressing misinformation and supporting behaviour change.15,16 Approaches co-designed with community organisations consistently outperformed one-way, top-down messaging, particularly for populations facing structural disadvantage.17 These community capacities represent an untapped asset for preparedness planning, one that the incubator methodology is specifically designed to activate.14,18.

Positive deviance offers a productive and optimistic lens for making this intelligence visible. Within any community facing similar constraints, some individuals or groups achieve better-than-expected outcomes by diverging from prevailing norms — successes against the odds that reveal locally feasible solutions overlooked by formal evaluations.19 Applied to preparedness, positive deviance asks: where did early warning actually work? which community channels succeeded with populations that services rarely serve well? which ad hoc coordination mechanisms outperformed formal ones? The familiar term “hard-to-reach” is deliberately avoided here. It is deficit-based language that locates the difficulty in the population rather than in the design and reach of the health system, and “underserved” is the more accurate and more contemporary formulation.20 The answers to these questions are already held by communities themselves, waiting to be systematically disentangled, surfaced and shared.

Methodology and workshop design

Community-participatory intelligence is proposed here as a structured methodological and epistemic framework rather than as a general appeal to consultation. It is methodological in that it specifies who is convened, through which instruments, in what sequence, and with which outputs; it is epistemic in that it treats knowledge generated at community level as a distinct and valid level of evidence about system performance, standing alongside population-level indices and individual-level qualitative accounts rather than beneath them.

The incubator: a social laboratory for preparedness

The incubator workshop is designed as a structured social laboratory to generate exactly this kind of community-participatory intelligence. Its origins lie in peer-led, community-based capacity-building during the West African Ebola crisis, where the central and often decisive role of local actors and social dynamics in surveillance and response was brought into sharp relief; the approach has since been refined through health policy and strategy work in multiple settings.1 Small, diverse groups of approximately five participants — community members, frontline health or social care workers, local government or public health representatives, and civil society actors — work through three interlocking templates under trained facilitation (see Table 1).

Table 1 Templates for community-participatory intelligence.

Full size table

Facilitation is a pivotal role, and the question of who provides it shapes what can be said in the room. Facilitators require training in participatory group process, working knowledge of preparedness and RCCE concepts, fluency in the local language and cultural context, competence in managing conflict and silence, and the absence of any line-management, funding, or enforcement relationship with participants. Each possible source carries trade-offs. Facilitators from municipal government or public health authorities bring convening power and a direct route into planning cycles, but risk deference, self-censorship, and the perception that the exercise serves institutional agendas. Staff of social service agencies bring practical familiarity with local provision, yet in most settings still depend on community organisers to reach participants at all — a dependency that should be made explicit rather than bypassed. Facilitators drawn from community-based organisations bring trust and access, but may reproduce the internal hierarchies of the community and be regarded as partisan by other groups within it. External or academic facilitators bring independence but lack standing relationships. The arrangement recommended here is therefore co-facilitation: an independently trained facilitator paired with a facilitator nominated by a community organisation, with the community partner contracted and paid for that role. Power differentials are then mitigated through concrete procedure — institutional and community participants work in separate breakout groups for the first template, so that community accounts are formulated before officials respond to them; voting is written and anonymous rather than by open show of hands; speaking time is allocated explicitly; dissenting minority positions are recorded verbatim instead of being reconciled; and ground rules on attribution and non-retaliation are agreed before the session begins.

The action matrix is a 3 × 3 grid mapping information, communication, and coordination across the phases before, during, and after a relevant event. For each cell, participants describe what currently happens, the conditions shaping these practices, and the barriers and facilitators influencing them. Facilitators then ask participants to identify where practice diverged from stated objectives — both harmful deviations (delayed signal recognition, confused messaging, coordination breakdowns) and beneficial ones (informal communication channels that worked, improvised coordination that outperformed formal structures).14,15,16,17,18,21.

The modified theory of change builds on this map. For each domain — information, communication, coordination — groups define a desired situation, specify indicators of progress (quantitative measures and qualitative signposts), and anchor the desired trajectory in existing positive deviance examples: locally validated cases where aspects of the ideal have already been achieved.19 Groups then propose interventions to formalise successful informal practices, build partnerships with community organisations, adjust communication channels, and revise coordination responsibilities.

The work planner translates insights into a time-bound action plan with short- (0–6 months), medium- (6–18 months), and long-term (> 18 months) objectives, specifying actions, blocking factors, enabling factors, and strategies to address constraints. This produces a locally owned implementation plan that can be incorporated into RCCE strategies and preparedness plans and monitored over time.14,18.

A single worked example may make the sequence concrete. Consider early symptom recognition on a large housing estate. In the action matrix, the group places in the information/during cell the observation that residents learned of a local cluster through a neighbourhood messaging group several days before the official notification reached them, and records this as a beneficial deviation: an informal channel outpaced the formal one. In the modified theory of change, the group defines the desired situation as reliable notification of residents within twenty-four hours, sets one quantitative indicator (time from first recognised cluster to community notification) and one qualitative signpost (residents can say whom they would ask), and anchors the trajectory in the positive deviance case already identified — the messaging group that achieved it unaided. In the work planner, the same issue becomes a graded plan: formalising a liaison between the estate’s messaging group and the local health authority within 0–6 months; a paid community focal-point role at 6–18 months; and inclusion of that role in the standing municipal preparedness plan beyond 18 months — with blocking factors (uncertainty about data protection, staff turnover, unpaid workload) and enabling factors (existing trust, an interested municipal officer) recorded against each horizon. The same path can be traced for informal community communication or for the distribution of protective equipment.

The methodology draws on CBPR,6,7,10,11,12 grassroots indicators work,13 RCCE evidence,14,15,16,17,18 positive deviance,19 earlier outbreak detection research,22,23 and the Ebola-era legacy.1,24.

Although the incubator is presented here as a retrospective exercise conducted between events, it is not confined to inter-crisis periods. The three templates can be run in abbreviated form during the opening weeks of an emergency, when practices are still forming and deviations are at their most visible, and repeated at intervals through a protracted response. The stronger option is to designate the incubator in advance as a standing element of the response architecture, with facilitators, participating organisations, data arrangements, and funding identified while no emergency is under way, so that convening does not have to be negotiated under time pressure. Formulated as policy in this way, the mechanism can be activated rather than invented when the next event begins.

From social laboratory to health security infrastructure

The incubator’s value extends well beyond single workshop outputs. Its deeper contribution lies in what it offers as a recurrent, institutionalised practice embedded in preparedness cycles — a reliable mechanism for generating, updating, and applying community-participatory intelligence over time.

First, it reorients preparedness around deviations and context rather than static capacity inventories. By focusing group attention on where and why practice diverges from objectives — in real settings, with real people — it supports more anticipatory and adaptive governance, enriching the picture that retrospective index scores alone can provide.

Second, incubators can function as meso-level infrastructures linking community-level experience to national and global monitoring systems. Community-generated indicators and narrative signposts produced through incubators could be mapped onto IHR monitoring frameworks and ECDC reporting systems, providing a structured channel for bottom-up intelligence to inform top-down planning.5,13 This is precisely the integration that preparedness science is calling for: not more indicators designed by experts, but indicators co-produced with the communities that experience system performance first-hand. The institutional obstacles to that integration should not be understated. IHR and ECDC instruments are constructed for counts, rates, and standardised indicators with fixed case definitions; they routinely discard the contextual qualifiers that give a community observation its meaning, and their incentives reward comparability across jurisdictions over local validity. Narrative signals also lack the denominators that formal systems expect before they will act. Three practical measures follow. Each community-generated indicator should travel with a short structured narrative field attached, rather than having it stripped at the point of data entry. Qualitative signposts should be coded against an agreed local taxonomy so that they can be aggregated without being flattened. And community outputs should be given a defined status as contextual annotation to routine reporting, instead of being forced into indicator slots designed for something else. Existing digital infrastructure offers a concrete point of connection: cohort-management platforms built for prospective population monitoring, such as the prospective monitoring and management of incident health events (PIA) application deployed in German digital epidemic panels, already collect structured symptom and behaviour data at scale and could in principle be operated in a self-organised, bottom-up manner by communities themselves, with incubator outputs determining which questions such an instrument should ask locally.25,26 This would make community-generated intelligence available to response and research teams in processable form during an event, rather than only in retrospect.

Third, the methodology gives practical form to positive deviance for preparedness planning.19 By systematically identifying local successes against the odds and the conditions that enabled them, incubators surface solutions that are already feasible and contextually grounded — a more reliable and efficient starting point for improvement than externally designed best-practice templates.

Fourth, scaling incubators calls for purposeful investment in facilitation capacity, participatory infrastructure, and ethical governance — including clarity about data ownership, consent, and the recognition of community contributions.1,6,7,11,12 Practitioners adopting this approach are encouraged to engage openly with the power dynamics inherent in facilitated group processes and to design governance arrangements that ensure inclusivity, prevent elite capture, and guarantee that community-generated outputs are used in the spirit in which they were produced.

Fifth, institutionalisation demands explicit reflexivity about the political economy of community engagement. Celebrating community agility, self-organisation, and adaptive capacity can inadvertently legitimise the transfer of statutory duties onto populations and organisations that are already underfunded and overburdened. Pandemic preparedness is a core governmental obligation. Framing community intelligence as an untapped asset must not license treating community-based organisations as a free resource capable of substituting for state infrastructure, least of all where they operate under chronic financial precarity. Community-participatory mechanisms are not a cheap alternative to public infrastructure; they are a dialectical mechanism for demanding institutional accountability and for directing public resources to where they are most needed. This has concrete consequences for how participation is resourced. Community participants should be reimbursed on the same principle as professional participants, whose attendance is paid for as work: sessional payment or stipends, paid facilitation roles, reimbursement of travel, childcare, and care-substitution costs, and contracted funding for partner organisations rather than in-kind expectation. Sustainability at scale then depends on a dedicated and recurrent line within preparedness financing rather than short project grants; on embedding incubator cycles within existing statutory planning obligations so that they are funded as routine practice; and on rotating participation so that the burden is distributed rather than concentrated on the same few individuals.

Sixth, the flow of value must be reciprocal and the distribution of authority explicit. If community experience travels upwards into national and global monitoring systems while nothing travels back, the model is extractive whatever its language. Reciprocity is therefore specified as a condition rather than an aspiration: outputs are returned to participating communities in usable form; a defined share of the resources mobilised by the resulting plans is committed to the priorities communities themselves identified; authorities respond formally and on the record to each recommendation, stating what will be implemented and, where it will not, why; and communities retain attribution and co-authorship of the intelligence they produce. Decision rights are named at the outset rather than left implicit. The preparedness objectives against which deviations are assessed are co-defined with participants at the start of the workshop rather than imported ready-made; participants are selected jointly with community organisations; facilitators are nominated in part by those organisations and paid; the agenda is agreed in advance with community partners; disagreement is documented rather than resolved by the convener; outputs are validated by participants before release; and implementation decisions, which necessarily remain with statutory bodies, are subject to the documented public response just described. Without this clarity, structured participation risks expanding opportunities for input without altering the institutional authority that determines which knowledge counts as actionable.

Seventh, the method must anticipate that the next pandemic may collide with community values rather than align with them. Where an infection is associated with stigmatised behaviours, identities, or groups, faithful and collaborative participation cannot be assumed. The mpox outbreaks, and the HIV epidemic before them, showed how rapidly the question of who transmits an infection becomes contested, and how difficult legitimate epidemiological framing and stigmatising framing can be to separate in practice.27,28,29 Incubators are not immune to this dynamic: convening a mixed group can expose affected minorities to the prejudices of their neighbours, and community consensus may itself be exclusionary. The design responses are to hold separate sessions with affected communities whose outputs are aggregated rather than debated in plenary; to permit anonymous and proxy contribution through trusted intermediaries; to make the participation of any identifiable group voluntary and revocable; and to treat divergence between community framings and public health framings as substantive intelligence about the acceptability and likely effect of proposed measures, rather than as noise to be facilitated away.

Eighth, community-based mechanisms degrade precisely when they are most needed, and must be designed for that. As a pandemic progresses, participants and their families fall ill, are bereaved, or are harmed economically by the measures intended to protect them, while the prevention paradox works against continued cooperation: successful measures render the threat locally invisible, so that burdens come to seem disproportionate to a risk few people can see, and absence of evidence is read as evidence of absence.30 Robustness against these stressors depends less on exhortation than on structure — redundant and rotating participation, so that no individual is indispensable; explicit acknowledgement in the workshop materials that burdens fall unevenly, with that uneven distribution itself mapped as a deviation; transparent communication of what is not known alongside what is; visible reciprocity, so that participation continues to yield tangible local benefit; and linkage of participation to material support for those bearing the greatest cost.

Ninth, community intelligence and community surveillance are separated by a narrow and easily crossed line. Information that is valuable for preparedness can also expose individuals and groups to stigma, policing, immigration enforcement, political retaliation, or intensified data surveillance, and this risk is greatest exactly where early signals arise among marginalised populations or where informal practices and networks are documented. Consent and data ownership arrangements must therefore be specified in more detail than is customary: data minimisation, so that only what is needed for a stated purpose is recorded; collective as well as individual consent, since documenting a network implicates people who are not in the room; confidentiality and access controls; explicit limits on secondary use; the right of withdrawal, including retrospective removal of contributions; de-identification and aggregation before onward transmission; and community authority over what is transmitted at all. It follows that some knowledge should remain locally held. The incubator should be able to conclude that a finding is actionable within the community and not to be integrated into national or global systems, and that decision should rest with the community rather than with the convening authority.

Conclusion

The COVID-19 pandemic made clear both the limitations of existing preparedness frameworks and the extraordinary potential of communities as partners in health security. Communities were simultaneously the primary sites where early signals appeared, where communication succeeded or failed, and where coordination was improvised under pressure — and their knowledge and capacity represent an underutilised resource that preparedness systems are now well-placed to harness. The incubator workshop offers a structured, reproducible methodology to do precisely this: by treating community-participatory intelligence as a distinct epistemic dimension, combining a deviation-focused concept of risk with positive deviance and structured group facilitation, and translating insights into concrete action plans. Its promise is conditional rather than automatic: it holds only where participation is funded, decision rights are explicit, reciprocity is enforceable, and communities retain authority over what they disclose. Embedding incubators into routine preparedness cycles — at sub-national, national, and ultimately global levels, and designating them in advance as a mechanism to be activated when the next emergency begins — is a practical and achievable step towards health security systems that are built with and for the communities they serve.

Data availability

No datasets were generated or analysed during the current study.

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Funding

Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Anaesthesiology and Intensive Care Medicine, Jena University Hospital, Jena, Germany

    Petra Dickmann

  2. Department of Emergency Medicine, Jena University Hospital, Jena, Germany

    Petra Dickmann

  3. Thuringian Centre for Quality and Research in Emergency Medicine (ThuZenQ), Jena, Germany

    Petra Dickmann

Authors

  1. Petra Dickmann

Contributions

P.D. conceived and developed the conceptual framework underpinning this perspective article, including the identification of the preparedness paradox, the deviation-focused reframing of risk, and the design of the incubator workshop methodology with its three interlocking templates. P.D. conducted all literature searching, evidence selection, critical appraisal, and synthesis. P.D. drafted all sections of the manuscript — including the abstract, theoretical framing, methodological description, institutional scaling arguments, and conclusion — and completed all revisions. The conceptual foundations of the incubator approach draw directly on P.D.‘s original field work during the West African Ebola crisis and subsequent health policy and strategy work in multiple international settings. As the sole author, P.D. takes full accountability for the integrity, accuracy, and originality of this work.

Author biography

Petra Dickmann is Consultant in Emergency Medicine and Head of Research Group at the Department of Anaesthesiology and Intensive Care Medicine, Jena University Hospital, Germany. She is also Head of the Thuringian Centre for Quality and Research in Emergency Medicine (ThuZenQ). Professor Dickmann’s research spans emergency and acute care medicine, health system resilience and preparedness, risk communication in public health emergencies, and community-based approaches to outbreak surveillance and response. She has led capacity-building initiatives in multiple international settings, contributed to the development of the ECDC risk communication training curriculum, and has published extensively in the fields of emergency medicine, health security, and risk communication. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3282-7614.

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Petra Dickmann.

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Artificial intelligence language model assistance was used solely to support the writing of this manuscript in academic British English. All intellectual content, scientific interpretation, and original ideas are exclusively the work of the author. The author takes full responsibility for the accuracy, integrity, and originality of this manuscript. Following peer review, the manuscript has additionally undergone a full human-led stylistic revision by the author, with particular attention to sentence length, em-dash use, and narrative cadence.

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Dickmann, P. Incubating pandemic preparedness: a social algorithm for community-participatory intelligence in health security. Sci. Rev. 1, 18 (2026). https://doi.org/10.1038/s44573-026-00019-9

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  • Received: 01 June 2026

  • Revised: 04 September 2026

  • Accepted: 07 September 2026

  • Published: 29 October 2026

  • Version of record: 29 October 2026

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s44573-026-00019-9

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