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Nature 健康护理主题·· 27 天前AI 评分56

理解冲突地区的诊断挑战并确定优先事项以应对抗菌药物耐药性

Understanding diagnostic challenges and identifying priorities to tackle antimicrobial resistance in conflict zones

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文章指出,冲突地区抗菌药物耐药性诊断面临多重挑战,包括基础设施破坏、资金不足和人力资源短缺。建议开发适应性强的自动化和数字诊断流程,以提高诊断能力。

正文

Introduction

The World Health Organisation (WHO) published its Global Action Plan (GAP) on Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) in 2015, highlighting existential risk to human health and laying foundations for a worldwide response with clear, united intent1. Compounding this threat, the COVID-19 pandemic led to profound interconnected economic disruption, while increasing geopolitical instability has resulted in a more divided and unpredictable global landscape2. AMR mitigation strategies must therefore consider risks amplified by mis-/disinformation, protectionism, restricted capital, reduced international cooperation, economic inequities/disputes, forcibly displaced populations and armed conflicts2,3.

Global conflict events have nearly doubled over the past 5 years, driven by political and socio-economic unrest, organised crime and large-scale state warfare4. Conflict is a key driver for AMR with considerable consequence for patients and healthcare systems globally5,6,7. Since publication of the WHO-GAP, annual reporting of conflict-associated AMR in the published literature has risen more than five-fold. Modern warfare has increasingly involved large scale combat operations and high intensity conflict with use of unmanned drone technology and long-range ballistics, causing a high burden of contaminated wounds and burns, prolonged evacuation timelines, delayed surgical intervention and consequent use of broad-spectrum, potentially poor quality, antimicrobials on the background of fragile diagnostic laboratory infrastructures with decreased healthcare financing8,9,10. Ongoing research suggests that heavy metals associated with weapons manufacture may have a role in further potentiating AMR11. Of major concern, direct attacks on healthcare personnel and infrastructure have surged to 2.5 healthcare facilities/day during 202512. Destruction of laboratories, lost equipment, staff shortages and training deficits are a major challenge8. AMR requires concerted global efforts, but issues identified in stand-alone national agendas designed for peacetime are further undermined in times of conflict.

Diagnostic development features strongly across the WHO-GAP strategic objectives1. Effective infection diagnostics identify pathogens, with clinical interpretation to differentiate from superficial colonisers and accurately determine their susceptibility profile. When data is representative, diagnostics can enable (i) rapid and targeted initiation of appropriate treatments and case management, (ii) guideline development, (iii) surveillance for emerging threats and (iv) infection prevention and control (IPC) measures. Diagnostics are critical in conflict settings to empower risk-prioritised, evidence-based treatment with the limited available resources. The implication of a lack of diagnostics can be sub-optimal selection of antimicrobials complicated by partial or interrupted treatment courses. However, implementation often lags behind evolving demands for bacteriology and mycology, diagnosis of blood borne viruses, and vaccine-preventable diseases, which surge when vaccination rates drop due to mass displacement9. AMR associated with infection of wounded populations presents an urgent crisis requiring immediate intervention8. Recent studies reporting on infections resulting from war wounds, for example, have shown high proportions of multidrug resistance among patients with Pseudomonas aeruginosa osteomyelitis in Mosul and Gaza or Klebsiella pneumoniae infections in Ukraine13,14. With this in mind, we analyse how conflict in settings with persistent national health governance (as opposed to predominantly humanitarian-led healthcare) shifts the needs and deliverability of bacterial AMR diagnostics and identify priority areas for adaptations to national action plans and interventions needed to strengthen diagnostic capacity, clinical management and AMR control resilience in response to the pressures of conflict.

Modern conflict and its impact on diagnostic demands for AMR

Conflict and the spread of infectious diseases interact with mutual reinforcement. Degraded health and hygiene infrastructure, forced migration and increased health needs create an ideal scenario for infection transmission, both internally and potentially in the wider region3,5,6,8,10. Regions experiencing conflicts have a variety of urgent, complex and interconnected security priorities3. Diagnostic demands vary by conflict characteristics, pre-existing AMR burden and socio-economic capabilities. For instance, the internal conflicts and crises effecting Venezuela and Colombia, present distinct diagnostic pressures compared to high-intensity explosive warfare in Ukraine or Gaza9,10,15. Detailed comparative analyses linking specific conflict taxonomies and socio-economic drivers to diagnostic outputs represent a critical area for dedicated further research.

To understand the current state of affairs, we reviewed situational analyses within National Action Plans (NAPs) of countries experiencing conflict-related emergencies with focus on areas retaining a persistent health governance structure for procurement and healthcare delivery. Current conflict-related emergencies were identified using the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)16 repository and available NAPs extracted from the WHO Library (Fig. 1)17. NAPs were included for 14/18 countries with varying levels of state-delivered healthcare including the Central African Republic, Federal Republic of Nigeria, Federal Republic of Somalia, Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Republic of Colombia, Republic of Lebanon, Republic of Mali, Republic of Yemen, Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Syrian Arab Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of Sudan, the State of Palestine and Ukraine. NAPs underwent focused review regarding impact or challenges associated with conflict and line-by-line analysis for perceived diagnostic capability gaps. Trend data was discussed among co-authors and key trends identified to inform the problem analysis. We found trends for major barriers to implementing diagnostic strategies (Fig. 1). Key threats included insecurity, porous borders, counterfeit/substandard materials, lack of funding, unsustainable supply chains, lack of trained personnel and trade sanctions (limiting engagement in external quality control). In practical terms, major issues in critical diagnostic capabilities were evident across pre-analytic, analytic and post-analytic phases. This was supported by international assessments of capabilities, including inadequate access to consumables, equipment or automation, suboptimal capacity for quality control, lack of diagnostic standardisation, inadequate or damaged healthcare infrastructure, lack of electronic data sharing/laboratory information management systems (LIMS), and insufficient/unreliable surveillance data for informing prescribing guidelines (Fig. 1)8,10,18. These circumstances drastically reduce the ability of laboratories to deliver accurate results to clinicians in time to make meaningful decisions.

Fig. 1: Understanding the dynamics of diagnostic need for antimicrobial resistance during modern major conflicts.

Figure generated following national action plan (NAP) review and insights from peer-reviewed literature8,12. A, B AMR diagnostic threats and weaknesses were identified through review of published NAP policy for the 10 countries with the highest rates of forcibly displaced populations and also for countries currently experiencing major conflict emergencies as per the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (www.unrefugees.org/emergencies), if not already included, for a total of 14 NAPs. Available NAPs were identified and reviewed for evidence of the current state of affairs and key challenges for implementing diagnostic strategies, with main overarching observations provided as a summary in (A, B). NAPs were reviewed for Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lebanon, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine and Yemen. C Key changes in diagnostic demands identified through available reporting from World Health Organization and non-governmental organisations and peer-reviewed literature. D Suggested initial AMR diagnostic priorities based on the trends in diagnostic service weaknesses and current understanding of changes in diagnostic needs.

Lessons learned from recent conflicts provide further insight to immediate AMR diagnostic needs. Modern warfare is associated with blast and ballistic injuries which are at high-risk of environmental contamination often requiring multiple surgical procedures that increase infection risk, particularly where initial surgical intervention is delayed or inadequate. Sudden increases in patients with traumatic injuries can be massive, with recent conflicts resulting in hundreds of thousands of amputations9. Laboratories therefore require sufficient flexibility to promptly diagnose systemic or deep-seated infections for these patients, while also responding to critical diagnostic demands such as increased provision of screened blood products (Fig. 1). In mass casualties, such as in Gaza, prioritisation and capacity for diagnosing infections and resistance are further challenged when survival is at stake.

The rapid flow of civilian and military patients along extended evacuation pathways to definitive surgical care is required, while socioeconomic crises can drive mass population migration complicating follow-up of results (Fig. 2)2,3,9. Patients pass through several facilities, challenging continuity of care and limiting opportunities to improve antimicrobial prescribing9. A mobile cloud based electronic health record has been proposed for refugees in low-resource settings as a potential way to track moving patients19, but present additional considerations for secure information management in contested settings.

Fig. 2: Global pattern of forcibly displaced populations due to conflict or threat of violence, 2024.

Choropleth map prepared using data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and represents the destination of the total number of individuals classified as refugees under the UNHCR mandate, asylum-seekers and internally displaced populations of concern during 2024 (www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download). Grey states represent areas of no data. The choropleth demonstrates the effect of conflict on mass migration both within individual states and cross-border to neighbouring regions, resulting in changing health needs and shifting diagnostic capability and capacity. Red pins represent current humanitarian emergencies according to UNHCR associated with political instability, violence or conflict including, from left to right, Central America (organised crime), Venezuela, Mali, Nigeria, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ukraine, South Sudan, Sudan, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Ethiopia, Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, Afghanistan and Myanmar (www.unrefugees.org/emergencies).

Reduced capacity for IPC alongside delayed wound management increases the likelihood of nosocomial AMR transmission9,10. Screening and surveillance for AMR is therefore vital, including for neighbouring countries, and must be sufficient to support IPC and inform treatment guidelines20. Antimicrobial consumption increases while drug supply security and logistic pipelines may become restricted. Implementation of suitable testing methods to support accessible antimicrobials must be ensured early, with options for redundancy. The high risk of AMR spillover to neighbouring countries through potential mass migration requires comprehensive regional diagnostic planning and preparedness3. Failure to do so may lead to inappropriate use of antimicrobials, higher rates of AMR transmission and antimicrobial treatment failures.

Diagnostic challenges for individual patient care

Diagnostics are integral to guiding targeted treatment and reducing recovery time for civilians, military personnel and the local healthcare workforce. The window of opportunity for diagnostics to impact antimicrobial decision-making, however, is limited. Traditional approaches for bacterial culture and identification are labour intensive and slow. Evidence of deliverability for automated analysers for blood cultures and antimicrobial susceptibility testing (AST) has been shown in conflict settings, offering significant improvements in speed, accuracy and quality of results in Ukraine, but availability of consumables remains a critical issue18. Such a system would seek to optimise, rather than replace manual testing and need to be suitably adapted for the stressed environment, having options for short-term battery-powered offline operations, limited cold chain requirements for transport of consumables and be supported by validated manual backup testing during times of limited power access. Fragmented or siloed healthcare services, including for patient records and LIMS, further diminish diagnostic value and utility, lagging behind real-time benefit for patient care and compromising clinician confidence in the system21. Implementation of a barcoding system and electronic LIMS (with capacity for offline systems/local backup) is therefore a necessity, ideally delivering to clinicians across the patient evacuation pathway, improving continuity of care and enabling AMS21. Failure to deliver real-time results as the patient moves through the evacuation care pathway introduces delays to patient management, undermines IPC and duplicates efforts in a resource limited environment.

Effective management of AMR requires identification of bacterial mechanisms of resistance1. Advances in rapid molecular diagnostics have enhanced access and utility of testing but are almost exclusively designed by high-income countries for high-income settings. Cost, availability, quality control and cold chain requirements limit adaptation for conflict settings, where funds may be limited and power unreliable. Simple technologies such as lateral flow assays could offer a cost-effective and practical solution for identifying key resistance mechanisms and may also be used to optimise dosing regimens22,23. Meanwhile lyophilisation of reagents for near-patient diagnostics can remove the need for cold chain storage and transport, making molecular diagnostic access more realistic. However, assessment of the real-world impact of these technologies in conflict settings remains limited.

Finally, AST must be conducted using validated methods, otherwise results have no real utility, inappropriately risk patient safety and can inappropriately skew AMR surveillance data. The rise of MDR infections has seen a surge in the use of colistin for example, yet disc diffusion methods/gradient strips are not supported by breakpoint committees and risk significant overcalling of susceptibility24,25. Limited access to novel antimicrobials may necessitate validation of alternative diagnostic methods (e.g. synergy testing of available agents), as a key priority, with support required from breakpoint-setting bodies. Once determined, national reference centres could be engaged to provide validation support to frontline facilities. Notwithstanding the need for robust clinical evidence to guide the use of combination therapy for existing drugs, access to novel antimicrobial drugs requires improvement in settings where there is limited financial, human and health system resources, such as in conflict zones. New models developed for low-income settings, such as the hub and spoke network model26, could improve equity in sustainable access to novel antimicrobial drugs in areas that retain persistent healthcare governance but require representative surveillance data to inform priority needs. In such settings, emergency diagnostic procurement frameworks may be required to improve access as needs are identified.

Diagnostic challenges for infection prevention and control (IPC)

Diagnostics for IPC are critical for managing outbreaks and preventing the spread of AMR8,10. However, they may be deprioritised during times of conflict due to lack of education and resources, competing organisational or political agendas, or prolonged turnaround times and associated lack of utility10. The IPC risk is further amplified where casualties are housed together, allowing resistant organisms to spread between individuals and facilities. A small IPC team can be effective in maintaining baseline standards and responding to limited outbreaks, but staff shortages can be significant and training deficits coupled with a high patient burden will significantly challenge stressed healthcare systems. However, capacity building for IPC during war and political instability has been demonstrated in Yemen where a ‘train the trainer’ model was established during the COVID-19 pandemic, which focussed on ‘learning while doing’27.

Diagnostics can provide considerable support to IPC, with screening protocols adaptable to perceived risk. Screening is rarely employed in conflict settings but recognition of high rates of nosocomial transmission of AMR, and the need to evacuate patients through multiple facilities make it a critical, cost-effective tool. Acceptability of screening programmes will vary based on socio-cultural perceptions and this must be considered during planning. Other examples of good practice include molecular testing for multidrug-resistant tuberculosis and point-of-care nucleic acid-based amplification tests to rapidly differentiate respiratory tract infections, supporting IPC and AMS. There remains a lack of tailored setting-specific guidance for IPC, taking into consideration resources and diversity of patient needs, including differences in social cultures, personnel, training, and available diagnostics. Recent reports have shown that the most powerful way to improve IPC in an active conflict setting is to have ‘on the ground’ tailored support for long-lasting impact and behavioural change28. Simplified high-impact interventions, such as innovations for hand hygiene applications, online tools and training for frontline healthcare workers are low hanging fruits. Collaboration with national Ministries of Health for sustainable improvements can be very impactful.

Diagnostic challenges for AMR surveillance and epidemiology

We do not yet understand the interplay between conflict drivers of AMR, with limited available data prior to or during fighting. AMR surveillance varies between regions, and optimised reporting is essential to rapidly gather data to inform local epidemiology and prescribing guidelines, and to focus diagnostic funding and procurement needs29.

Introduction of an electronic LIMS, and design of minimal required datasets, shared with regional public health bodies, could reduce workload and improve engagement and representation21. Such data must have bilateral availability, feeding back down to laboratories to help inform stock procurement, quality, local guidelines and evolving diagnostic requirements. As discussed, to maximise effectiveness, electronic LIMS would need to have offline capability with capacity for local storage/backup during connectivity outages and cloud syncing to national databases. Linked systems allowing results to be accessed across the evacuation pathway, even when there are regular internet disruptions, to sites delivering definitive surgery and rehabilitation could lead to consequent reductions in empiric broad spectrum antimicrobial use.

Evidence has shown rapidly evolving patterns of AMR in regions of conflict and spread of AMR across borders to neighbouring countries2,3,5, where its extent challenges the diagnostic and treatment capabilities of even the most prepared countries. Reporting of surveillance data, therefore, has profound benefits for emerging threat detection and global health security3. Indeed, surveillance, including the importance of sentinel site monitoring and central reporting has been identified in as a key intervention in the recent WHO Policy Brief on ‘Addressing AMR in Fragile and Conflicted-affected Situations’30, although caution must be applied in representativeness of gathered data across the patient care pathway.

Recommendations

Conflict is a key driver of AMR and the risk of regional spread transcends national responsibility and capability to mitigate2. There is an urgent imperative to address inequitable access to suitable AMR diagnostics for populations facing conflict as well as a mutually beneficial requirement to protect global security by recognising emerging AMR and limiting transmission2.

Access to reliable diagnostic tools for large at-risk populations is therefore the immediate priority. Early evidence suggests value in securing access to automated testing and AST for available therapeutics in addition to suitable screening methods for efficient AMR detection18. Digitalisation of laboratory information management systems, with offline capability, is also an early service necessity for real-time data recording and sharing to clinicians and public health21. Global research and development (R&D) activities must focus on fit-for-purpose tools. In this way, diagnostic microbiology can be rapidly improved across conflict settings with persistent healthcare governance to the benefit of patients and clinicians, thereby supporting positive engagement with AMS and IPC, reducing AMR transmission, limiting morbidity and mortality, and focusing R&D.

These activities come with technical, training, quality assurance, logistic and cost implications. To be most effective, nations at risk of geopolitical instability need to identify suitable diagnostic tools and agile emergency procurement frameworks, both in policy and practice, ideally before the outbreak of conflict. Options will vary considerably across different conflict situations however, where the viability and scope for implementing AMR strategies will differ as political and civil infrastructures are affected. Global sharing of impacts for projects aimed at integrating diagnostic readiness and amid geopolitical instability would help to identify windows of opportunity for stakeholders (including the state) in areas of greatest concern, acting to highlight rising areas of risk and increase political will to improve AMR resilience as a security priority beforehand. Key recommendations are summarised in Table 1 (with detailed examples of how these elements may interact in a conflict setting, where there is persistent delivery of healthcare funding and policy by the state, are presented in Supplementary Fig. 1). Such a system could help inform regional rather than standalone domestic policy to mitigate risk of AMR spread during conflict. Example responses could include regional body technical support, use of central funding and regional development banks30, lesson sharing/amplification and building of mutually beneficial resilience. Examples of current efforts include the European Union-funded SURE-AMR project that aims to enhance and support AMR research excellence in Ukraine using a One Health approach. This project however relies on a network comprised of mostly high-income countries and may not be directly applicable to other regions, risking further inequity. Improvements in AMR reporting, particularly when  associated with travel, may help provide evidence to political stakeholders on the benefit of mutual resilience building in these areas31. Lessons learned as part of initiatives such as the recently announced memorandum of understanding between the WHO and ReAct Africa, including on aims to facilitate regional policy dialogue, may provide valuable insights on opportunities for proactive regional activity to support countries at threat of, or in the midst of, conflict32. Immediate multilateral support is urgently needed once conflict begins. As national operational dynamics and administrative structures vary significantly across regions, international assistance, such as standardised emergency diagnostic kit donations, must remain agile and align with existing state ways of working rather than imposing a one-size-fits-all framework. If delivered well, such programmes can offer temporary offset of severe national socio-economic and procurement constraints18, providing a foundation for affordable access to consumables, streamlining of procurement processes, on-site training, academic and political collaboration and ‘push/pull’ incentives for companies developing practical AMR diagnostic technologies (Table 1. Supplementary Fig. 1). Such measures must be in place before conflict progresses to a predominantly humanitarian-led healthcare system, where implementation of many of these recommendations is likely to be much less feasible.

Table 1 Summary of key recommendations for antimicrobial resistance diagnostic priorities across a state driven response to emerging armed conflict

Full size table

Opportunities to learn lessons from countries with experience of mass migration pressures, such as Colombia, could be of particular value through feedback from frontline clinicians and scientists to government and regional bodies for recovery, resilience and rebuilding. Recovery is a major consideration for diagnostic planning and preparedness as the need for support will continue.

Summary

Addressing the critical AMR diagnostic capability gaps in conflict settings is essential for individual patient care, for the control of outbreaks and for global health security. Development and deployment of ruggedized automated and digital processes, including reliable AST for available antimicrobials and cost-effective screening, which can function off-line and near-patient testing, are potential solutions for timely, high-volume, accurate and meaningful results for patient care. Conflict zones are heterogeneous—so while important lessons can be learned across these settings, attention must be given to the nature of the conflict, pre-conflict AMR burden, existing laboratory capabilities, trained workforce, funding, and socio-cultural factors.

Data availability

Data is available upon reasonable request can be made to scott.pallett@nhs.net and will be processed in line with local ethical guidance.

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Acknowledgements

R.A. acknowledges networks associated with her role as co-lead of the working group on Country Readiness and Capacity as part of the Fleming Initiativeconvening on diagnostics for addressing A.M.R.

Funding

The completion of this manuscript was not associated with any external funding and was completed as part of routine work.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Centre of Defence Pathology, Royal Centre for Defence Medicine, Queen Elizabeth Hospital, Birmingham, UK

    Scott JC Pallett & Matthew K. O’Shea

  2. Institute of Infection and Immunity, City St George’s University of London, Cranmer Terrance, London, UK

    Scott JC Pallett

  3. Institute of Molecular Biology and Genetics of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine

    Olena V. Moshynets

  4. Grupo de Investigaciones en Resistencia Antimicrobiana y Epidemiologia Hospitalaria (RAEH), Universidad El Bosque, Bogota, Colombia

    Maria V. Villegas

  5. Department of Health Services Research & Management, City St George’s, University of London, London, UK

    Raheelah Ahmad

  6. The Fleming Initiative, Imperial College London, London, England, UK

    Raheelah Ahmad

  7. Institute of Endemic Diseases, University of Khartoum, Khartoum, Sudan

    Muzamil M. Abdel Hamid & Hana Elbadawi

  8. Division of Infectious Diseases, Internal Medicine Department and Center for Infectious Diseases Research, American University of Beirut Medical Center, Beirut, Lebanon

    Souha S. Kanj

  9. ADVANCE-ID, Saw Swee Hock School of Public Health, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore

    David L. Paterson

  10. Clinical Infection Department, Chelsea & Westminster Hospital NHS Foundation Trust, London, UK

    Luke SP Moore

  11. National Institute for Health Research Imperial Biomedical Research Centre, Imperial College London, London, UK

    Luke SP Moore

  12. North West London Pathology, Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust, London, UK

    Luke SP Moore

  13. Academic Department of Military Medicine, Royal Centre for Defence Medicine, Queen Elizabeth Hospital, Birmingham, UK

    Matthew K. O’Shea

  14. Institute of Immunology and Immunotherapy, College of Medicine and Health, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK

    Matthew K. O’Shea

  15. David Price Evans Global Health and Infectious Disease Research Group, Institute of Systems Molecular and Integrative Biology, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK

    Sara E. Boyd

  16. Department of Clinical Infection, South West London Pathology, St George’s University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust, London, UK

    Sara E. Boyd

Authors

  1. Scott JC Pallett
  2. Olena V. Moshynets
  3. Maria V. Villegas
  4. Raheelah Ahmad
  5. Muzamil M. Abdel Hamid
  6. Hana Elbadawi
  7. Souha S. Kanj
  8. David L. Paterson
  9. Luke SP Moore
  10. Matthew K. O’Shea
  11. Sara E. Boyd

Contributions

S.J.C.P., L.S.P.M., O.V.M., D.L.P. and S.E.B. designed the initial methodology. S.J.C.P. and S.E.B. extracted data. S.J.C.P., O.V.M., M.V.V., R.A., M.M.A.H., H.E., S.S.K., D.L.P., L.S.P.M., M.K.O.’S, S.E.B. contributed to overall priority discussions and provided insights on local experience within their own regions. S.J.C.P. and S.E.B. drafted the initial manuscript. S.J.C.P., O.V.M., M.V.V., R.A., M.M.A.H., H.E., S.S.K., D.L.P., L.S.P.M., M.K.O.’S, S.E.B. reviewed the initial manuscript and provided comments. All authors agreed on the final manuscript.

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Sara E. Boyd.

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Competing interests

S.J.C.P. has received research grants from the Drummond Foundation, John Muir Trust, and Healthcare Infection Society, not in connection with this work. S.J.C.P. was a Parliamentary Intern to the Office of Dr. Danny Chambers MP on behalf of the British Society for Antimicrobial Chemotherapy (2024–2025). OVM has received research grants from the European Commission under HORIZON.4.1 (Grant Agreement No. 101160053). MVV has received educational grants and support for research from MSD, Pfizer, bioMérieux and West. DLP’s institution has received funding for research grants for which he is Principal Investigator from Pfizer, Shionogi, Merck, bioMerieux, BioVersys, F2G and Gilead Sciences. He has consulted for and/or received speaker fees from the AMR Action Fund, GARDP, CARB-X, BioVersys, Aurobac, Kinvard, Gangagen, Spero, Pfizer, Vedanta, Menarini, Shionogi, bioMérieux, Cepheid, Advanz. LSPM has consulted for or received speaker fees from bioMerieux (2013–2025), Eumedica (2016–2025), Pfizer (2018–2025), Sumitovant (2021–2023), Shionogi (2021–2025), Qiagen (2023–2025), Gilead (2024), BioNTech (2024), Insmed (2024), and Advanz (2024–2025) and received research grants from the National Institute for Health and Care Research (NIHR, 2013–2025), CW+ Charity (2018–2025), North West London Pathology (2022–2024), LifeArc (2020–2022), Shionogi (2024–2025), Infectopharm (2022–2024), the Joint Programming Initiative on AntiMicrobial Resistance (2023–2025), and the Healthcare Infection Society (2024–2025). MKO has received research grants from the NIHR, the Medical Research Council, the Wellcome Trust, the Kennedy Trust, and the Ministry of Defence. SEB received research support from Roche Pharma, educational support from Advanz Pharma, and has received consultancy and/or speaker fees from Sumitovant, Shionogi, the U.K Clinical Pharmacy Association, and bioMérieux. All other authors have no conflicts to declare.

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Communications Medicine thanks Nicola Petrosillo and Viktoriia Holubnycha for their contribution to the peer review of this work.

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Pallett, S.J., Moshynets, O.V., Villegas, M.V. et al. Understanding diagnostic challenges and identifying priorities to tackle antimicrobial resistance in conflict zones. Commun Med 6, 554 (2026). https://doi.org/10.1038/s43856-026-01866-2

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  • Received: 13 April 2026

  • Accepted: 11 August 2026

  • Published: 24 October 2026

  • Version of record: 24 October 2026

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s43856-026-01866-2

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